This page is the third to be published on the Internet from our Air France Flight 447 Project. Several excellent examples of data display illustrate aspects of the flight of the Airbus 330 aircraft (F-GZCP) that flew the ill fated Air France, Flight 447 on May 31 / June 1, 2009 from Rio de Janeiro, Brazil to Paris, France. Target date to have all five chapters of the Air France 447 project online is December 1, 2011. Photos and technical graphs are presented in a larger size than is usual for a web page so that details and small font text may be read as easily as is possible. This web page is coded for 1280 x 800 monitor display which is a wide screen (landscape) format. Printout is 14 pages in 11 x 8.5 inch format. Please bookmark this page and occasionally check back to remain current with the publication schedule for the AF 447 Project.
Comments and opinions in this article are the sole responsibility of Bennett Blumenberg and do not reflect the views of any organization, government or private, that are mentioned in this article. The author does not have any relationship, public or private, with the organizations referenced in this article.
"These copied traces have used the highest resolutions available and also have a Smoothed Normal Acceleration curve added to give an indication where the +/- 'g'
forces were. From the commencement at 02:10:51.4 of the Stall Warning, thin dotted lines showing the 'smoothed' traces for both the AoA and Pitch Attitude angles are included. CLMAX occurred at 02:10:56.5, and the 'g' break within a further second. Some post stall pitching oscillations matched by the AoA values took place for a few more seconds before the AoA rapidly moved toward 30 degrees and the FPA moved into negative territory. Back earlier at the AP and ATHR disconnect(s), the traces are rather 'lumpy' - an artifact of the turbulence occurring as the aircraft commenced the initial climb."
Click here to display this graph in a larger format - 1100 x 700. “The time the stall actually occurred is shown as 2:10:59 and observation will show that the aircraft gained a small amount of height by ballistic momentum over the next 6 seconds.”
“The 13° NU position of the Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer (THS) will most likely have helped in stabilizing the descent.”
The Air Data and Inertial Reference System (ADIRS) supplies temperature, anemometric barometric and inertial parameters to the Primary Flight Display and cockpit displays that are critical to the pilots. “An ADIRS consists of up to three fault tolerant ADIRUs located in the aircraft electronic rack, an associated Control and Display Unit (CDU) in the cockpit and remotely mounted Air Data Modules (ADMs).[6] The No 3 ADIRU is a redundant unit . . Reference (IR) fault in ADIRU No 1 or 2 will cause a loss of attitude and navigation information on their associated Primary Flight Display (PFD) and Navigation Display (ND) screens. An ADR (Air Data Reference)
fault will cause the loss of airspeed and altitude information on the affected display. In either case the information can only be restored by selecting the No 3 ADIRU.
ISIS is the Integrated Standby Instrument System, designed and installed in the Airbus family of aircraft. ISIS provides an independent source of attitude, airspeed, Mach, altitude and vertical speed, and can also provide magnetic heading provided by another system via ARINC 429 or from a Magnetometer. It is particularly suited to high speed, highly maneuverable fighter aircraft, as well as Airbus airliners. In 2004, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority of Australia identified a time counter fault which causes loss of all Electronic Instrument System (EIS) Display Units (DU). This condition occurs after 145 hours of continuous operation of ISIS and is very dangerous as the pilots are deprived of essential flight data. Reset should be performed on the ground after a complete electrical shutdown. There appears to have been an ISIS malfunction in the cockpit of Air France Flight 447, but the details have not been made available.
At a certain level of dysfunction with data streams from control surfaces (sensors, computer chips), the central computer systems will automatically re-adjust. Normal Law will be set aside and depending upon the degree of difficulties, Alternative or Direct Law will become operational with the attendant loss of several or most 'protections' of the flight envelope. Understand that these changes are not implemented by the human Pilot Flying. When certain thresholds of difficulty are reached, 'systems' makes these changes and informs the cockpit. At this point, the pilots find themselves with some small measure of direct input into flying the aircraft (Alternative Law), or in direct control of almost all important functions as in days of old (Direct Law).
This web page is an appendix from the eBook that derives from our Air France Flight 447 project. Chapters and appendices from this ebook are released out of sequence so as to make them available at the earliest possible date.
The first chapter in the Air France, Flight 447 eBook introduces the flight of Airbus F-GCZP from Rio de Janeiro to Paris, May 31/June 1, 2009 and the serious problems that soon became apparent to the crew. The second chapter in this eBook discusses the search for the wreckage of Air France, Flight 447, and the recovery of the Flight Deck Recorder and Cockpit Voice Recorder. The third chapter reviews the last five minutes of Air France, Flight 447. The fourth chapter examines the design and function of the pitot-static and angle of attack sensors whose data is essential to the Fly-By-Wire computer system interaction with flight control surfaces. There is a consensus that iced over pitot tubes rendered the Airbus 330 computer system unable to properly instruct flight control surfaces because the data stream the conveyed essential parameters about the flight envelope was either absent or corrupted from a critical time point forward. The fifth chapter will look at the vertical stabilizer of Airbus 330 aircraft, review the problems inherent with carbon-resin components in aircraft design, review aviation incidents in which tail components detached from the aircraft fuselage, and attempt to assess the contribution to the Air France FLight 447 tragedy that was made by the loss of the vertical stabilizer.
The sixth chapter will look at 'hypercomplexity' as inherently problematic in aircraft design. The seventh and last chapter will attempt an integrative scenario - synthetic analysis - to explain the AF 447 tragedy. Several suggestions for changes to aircraft design and pilot training will be offered. Target date to have all chapters and appendices online is February 1, 2012, at which point this ebook can be read in a coordinated sequence. Photos and technical graphs are presented in a larger size than is usual so that details and small font text may be read as easily as is possible. The design of these web pages is optimized for a monitor
resolution of 1440 x 900. If your monitor is set to display smaller dimensions, horizontal scrolling of these web pages will be necessary. Please bookmark this page and occasionally check back to remain current with this publication schedule.
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