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AIR FRANCE 447 - A SYNTHETIC ANAYLYSIS / CHAPTER THREE THE LAST FIVE MINUTES - 1 Published December 11, 2011. These pages will be updated as new research is published.
This article is Chapter 3, of the synthetic analysis and timeline that is derived from our Air France, Flight 447 Research. Target date to have all five chapters online is February 1, 2012. Photos and technical graphs are presented in a larger size than is usual for a web page so that details and small font text may be read as easily as possible. This web page was coded for 1280 x 800 monitor display which is a wide screen (landscape) format. Printout of Chapter 3 will be 35 pages in 11 x 8.5 inch format. Please bookmark this page and occasionally check back to remain current with the publication schedule for the AF 447 Project.
Comments and opinions in this article are the sole responsibility of Bennett Blumenberg and do not reflect the views of any organization, government or private, that are mentioned in this article. The author does not have any relationship, public or private with the individuals, corporations and organizations referenced or mentioned in this article.
Our Air France 447 research project will result in ~200 web pages, organized as an eBook with chapters, when completed. A professional background is not requisite to understand most of this presentation. Technical text and graphs can be skipped over by those so inclined. The situational awareness of Air France Flight 447 is complicated, that is the reality of this disaster, and there are several scenarios to be dissected and then interwoven. Contrary to some published analysis of this tragedy, it cannot be explained by pilot error. Elevating 'pilot error' to a position of priority and most importance only serves to erect a large screen that blocks out the multiple parameters that coalesced to produced this most awful commercial aircraft accident. Yes, the pilots in the cockpit of this Airbus A300 aircraft did make errors in judgment. They made decisions that in hindsight do not seem first rate, but then their situational awareness had been destroyed. In the dark of early morning hours, a crisis came upon FCZCP that rapidly placed all lives at risk. The emphasis upon 'pilot error' is particularly insidious when used by the BEA of France. BEA is the rough equivalent in France of the American National Safety and Transportation Board, and is the government agency that conducts all investigations of incidents involving French aircraft and airlines when such an inquiry is warranted. BEA stands for B(bureau) E(nquiry) A(viation), which expands to Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses pour la Sécurité de l'Aviation Civile (BEA; English: Bureau of Enquiry and Analysis for Civil Aviation Safety]. BEA is known and respected throughout the world, make no mistake about that as you read criticisms of their investigation of Air France, Flight 447. Parallel to the investigation of the BEA are those of Airbus corporate, which may never be released to the public; and Air France, where at least a summary is expected for press publication.
Click Here for the COMPLETE 4.5 MINUTE MPEG 4 MOVIE OF HURRICANE BONNIE, , May 31 to June 1, 2009.
Hurricane Bonnie was a severe and unusual cyclone that made landfall in North Carolina on August 27, 1998 as a Category 2-3 hurricane. Bonnie caused extensive economic damage as it moved swiftly north/northeast and passed south of Nova Scotia and Newfoundland as a tropical storm on August 29, 1998. Of particular interest to this research project is the unusually tall cloud structure which was simulated and studied extensively by NASA. Peak cloud tops surrounding the eyewall rose 59,000 ft (18,0090 m) into the atmosphere.
Hurricane.Bonnie-Towers in the Tempest as written, produced and animated by - the NASA/Goddard Space Flight Center Scientific Visualization Studio,, 2007
Hurricane Bonnie provided data to study the formation and movement of dynamic 'hot towers'. Hot Towers move with multiple updrafts and act like 'express elevators' to accelerate hurricane energy into very high altitudes. Did the storm encountered by Air France, Flight 447, although only occasionally referred to as a hurricane, possess this dynamic structure?
TROPICAL MCS in the SOUTH ATLANTIC OCEAN
Data display - by Tim Vasquez, Air France Flight 447: A detailed meteorological analysis. If the SW and NE directions are reversed, this 1974 diagram suffices to depict the ITCZ region within which AF 447 flew to her death. Data from buoys and marine ships in the area revealed an homogenized air mass at 27 deg C which was in equilibrium with the sea surface temperature of 27-28 deg C. Dew point temperatures were 23.5 – 24.0 deg C, revised June 1, 2011.
HURRICANE MICHAEL, OCTOBER 1, 2000 / Data from Radar and Dropsonde - Wind Speed Cross-section
Hurricane cross section - - by J. Walter Strapp, Atmospheric Characterization for High Ice Water Content in
Deep Convective Cloud Michael's strength peaked as a Category One Hurricane with land fall and most damage occurring in Newfoundland, Canada. As with many hurricanes, it was studied using a dropsonde which is a weather balloon that holds a transmitter and at least three dozen miniature dropsonde capsules which are released into the storm. The dopsonde capsules send data to the balloon whose transmitter relays the data to a satellite for transmission to an earth based laboratory. Although at a lower altitude than the storm affect Air France, Flight 447, this structural diagram of Hurricane Michael helps to clarify the developing ITCZ weather model that enveloped F-GCZP that fateful night of May 31/June 1, 2009.
" . . in the region between 2º N to 4º N latitude and 25º W to 35º W longitude. Some of the individual convective clusters appeared to be developing very quickly — this leads to speculation that turbulence in the vicinity of these rapidly-developing storms may have played a role in the accident."
"There were a number of times when the minimum cloud top IR brightness temperature was -80º C or colder (light purple color enhancement), with the coldest cloud top temperature of -82º C occurring at 00:15 UTC. While this is certainly a cold cloud top temperature value, it cannot be considered “extreme” by any means: cloud top temperatures in tropical weather systems have been known reach -90º C or colder on occasion."
SMALL CONVECTION CLUSTERS WITH HIGH WV-IR TEMPERATURE DIFFERENCE
"The assumption is that when intense convection overshoots the tropopause into the warmer stratosphere, the water vapor that is pushed above the cloud top emits radiation at a warmer temperature than the actual cloud top below. Many pixels in the band of ITCZ convection exhibited WV-IR brightness temperature difference values in the 3-5º C range (darker red color enhancement). Of particular interest is the comparatively small cluster of convection that developed very rapidly around 02:00 UTC, near 1.75º N latitude and 31.7º West longitude (north of waypoint “SALPU”) — this cluster of convection exhibited WV-IR brightness temperature difference values as high as 4º C at 02:15 UTC. Could this rapidly-developing convective cell have generated severe turbulence that affected Air France flight 447 as it was passing nearby, en route to waypoint “TASIL”?""
METEOSAT 9 MAP, 10.8u IR CHANNEL / COLOR - CLOUD TOPS <40C / FIRST VIEW CONVECTIVE CLUSTERS / JUNE 1, 2009 - BEA Interim Report accident on 1st June 2009 to the Airbus A330-203, registered F-GZCP
QUIKSCAT OCEAN SURFACE WIND and TRMM DAILY RAINFALL (LEFT) / TRMM (TMI) SEA SURFACE TEMPERATURE and QUIKSCAT OCEAN SURFACE WIND VECTORS (RIGHT) - MAY 31, 2009 - Visualization of the state of the atmosphere during the AF447 Event by Gregory Leptoukh et al, Goddard Space Flight Center
F-GZCP FLIGHT TRACK AREA / WEATHER MAP
Map / Powerpoint Slide - AF 447 LE PLAN DE VOL / Powerpoint Presentation from Henry Marnet Cornus Blog at 20 Minutes (France)
Vasquez's analysis shows a significant convective system that developed rapidly 2300-0100 UTC. Most of the system material visible in these images is from debris fields from dying storms that were active the previous day. The active thunderstorms are represented by the “small scale mottled areas of cold cloud tops.” Precise identification of the thunderstorms is difficult but it seems that AF 447 did reach the northern edge of the precipitation before plunging to the ocean. Analysis of satellite data reveals the development of new cells, mostly on the northeast side of the cluster which then moved southwestward at 12 kt. There seems to be a strong inflow on the northern edge of this activity from northeast trade winds. Other analysis produced holographs that revel the northeastward propagation model. Deep layer sheer is ~10 kt toward the southeast, implying that downward draft cores are carried south or southwest of updrafts.
A pilot (user name indydave) contributed highly relevant observations to a page at the Flight Global blog on May 8, 2010. He reminded everyone that a hail shaft could: a) render the pitot pitot probe useless; b) destroy the random and radar antenna thereby forcing thunderstorm detection (and avoidance) into the realm of visual data; and c) a ruptured windscreen would explain the rapid decompression and possibly [likely] render the pilots unconscious and incapacitated. “Airliners maneuver near “multi-cell tropical convective (BEA's description) storms routinely. We always fly upwind of the strongest storms, but with jet stream winds in excess of 100 knots, hail can be encountered many miles from the storms as depicted on radar. With a near solid line, finding the safe corridors can be difficult. These severe storms are also capable of vertical growth in 1000s of feet per minute, and could have grown to 'meet' the aircraft.”
Most of the system material visible in these images is from debris fields from dying storms that were active the previous day. The active thunderstorms are represented by the “small scale mottled areas of cold cloud tops.” Precise identification of the thunderstorms is difficult but it seems that AF 447 did reach the northern edge of the precipitation before plunging to the ocean. Analysis of satellite data reveals the development of new cells, mostly on the northeast side of the cluster which then moved southwestward at 12 kt. There seems to be a strong inflow on the northern edge of this activity from northeast trade winds. Other analysis produced holographs that revel the northeastward propagation model. Deep layer sheer is ~10 kt toward the southeast, implying that downward draft cores are carried south or southwest of updrafts.
Contributions by a pilot (user name indydave) to a page at the Flight Global blog on May 8, 2010 are immediately relevant to this weather analysis. "If AF447 encountered a hail shaft, the removal of pitot tubes explains the loss of air data. Destruction of the radome and radar antenna would mean trying to avoid the thunderstorms by only visual means. Ruptured windscreens (yes, they are very thick)would explain the rapid decompression and possibly incapacitate the pilots, making manual recovery impossible. Airliners maneuver near “multi-cell tropical convective (BEA's description) storms routinely. We always fly upwind of the strongest storms, but with jet stream winds in excess of 100 knots, hail can be encountered many miles from the storms as depicted on radar. With a near solid line, finding the safe corridors can be difficult. These severe storms are also capable of vertical growth in 1000s of feet per minute, and could have grown to 'meet' the aircraft.”
MOST-LIKELY PARCEL AS PLOTTED ON THE FERNANDO DE NORONHA SOUNDING FOR 0000Z
Data display - by Tim Vasquez, Air France Flight 447: A detailed meteorological analysis,
Revised June 1, 2011.
A parcel was constructed that just barely achieves the isolated -80 deg C overshoot temperature detected on METEOSAT imagery. This was readily accomplished with a surface temperature of 27 deg C and dew point of 23 deg C (thus it realistically accounts for a certain amount of boundary layer mixing). The CAPE value obtained is 1067 J/kg, which by textbook definition is considered marginal for severe weather and typical for the tropics1. That is not to say it does not have severe weather risks, as the formula for typical maximum observed updraft velocity is: w=0.5*((2*CAPE)^0.5) which in this case gives 23 m/s (51 mph). It is probable that even this amount of instability was not observed, due to the potential for extensive mixing with an average dew point of 18C in the lowest 150 mb. The dilution of updraft strength below ~ FL200 likely contributes to lack of charge separation and lack of lightening. Above this level ice filled updrafts are warmed by latent heat of sublimation which re-energizes the updraft. Momentum increases and the cumulonimbus cloud reaches the stratosphere. METEOSAT data documents cumulonimbus overshoots 6,000' above the tropopause. Partial buoyancy at flight level is very likely. Maximum cumulonimbus tops were at 56,000' with an equilibrium at 47,000', all of which agrees with METEOSAT data.
GOES-10 is situated at 60 deg meridian. Satellite is positioned East of MCS over West Africa at 0 deg meridian for second data display and 15 minutes earlier. The structure revealed is consistent with the speculations offered by indydave that are quoted above: multiple layers of convective debris, some of which are remnants from the activity of the previous day, and extensive cirrus fields. It is difficult to project how much of this structure would have visible on the relevant instrument displays in the cockpit. What is strongly suggested is that entire system was at maximum intensity around 2300 0100Z as F-CGCP of Air France Flight 447 became immersed inside this weather structure. The cold spots described above would be the areas of highest concern as they signal the location of an active updraft producing new clouding could material in the upper troposphere" (Tim Vasquez) As the analysis and discussion above strongly suggests, the visibility of major components of this destructive storm structure would have been problematic. Once again, the evidence points to a highly degraded situational awareness in which the major parameters could not be controlled or remediated by the crew.
PROJECTED FLIGHT PATH OF AF 447 THROUGH TWO STRATO-CUMULOUS FORMATIONS - by Tim Vasquez, Air France Flight 447: A detailed meteorological analysis,
Revised June 1, 2011. Notice size and altitude of second storm formations. Blended with infra-red satellite data.
This reconstruction presents the dynamic environment that surrounded AF-447 as it attempted to fly through thunderstorm clusters. Vasquez created this model in June 2009 and believes it retains validity. Light shading is precipitation (rain, ?ice) near the surface, medium shading represents clouds, and dark shading indicated the strongly suspected updrafts. There is evidence – to be briefly presented below – that a deliberate deviation from the flight path was made as a last minute emergency adjustment to the unfolding crisis. In either case, AF 447 flew through the bulk of the MCS which would have presented a serious challenge if the pitot tubes and computer systems were working properly. As they were not functioning as designed, the situation was not retrievable by the pilots and a rapid dive toward the ocean ensured, aided and abetted by the loss of tail and vertical stabilizer.
In summary, severe turbulence that emerged at flight level was the primary weather challenge to the Flight 447. Researcher Ed Zipser's work is paramount and was utilized by Tim Vasquez to investigate a dynamic turbulence environment surrounding Flight 447. The updraft was slowed in the lower levels of the storm, then to regain upward momentum as all of the updraft air sublimated or froze into ice as the air approached flight level. Satellite imagery reinforces this conclusion as it documents a flight crossing through cold topped cumulonimbus clouds with a radiance temperature of ~ 205D K. These giant cumulonimbus clouds likely reached 40,000' and completely surrounded the aircraft.
SUPERCOOLED LIQUID WATER VRS TEMPERATURE Data Display by B. Geerts, University of Wyoming
Meteorological analysis of the immediate environment establishes that F-GZCP’s final 12 minutes were likely spent flying through a series of severe thunderstorms with extreme turbulence. Such conditions foster the creation of two types of dangerous ice that can adhere aircraft structures. Water droplets in such storms at high altitude become super cooled, they remain liquid to -40C. Hundreds of tiny droplets trap air as they adhere to the fuselage. A rough irregular surface of rime ice builds that disrupts air flow, particularly on the leading edge of wings and aircraft control surfaces.
With a flight temperature of -40 deg C as derived from proximity and -36 deg C parcel temperatures, the aircraft was exposed mainly to ice and perhaps graupel, in contrast to super cooled water, Either ice or supercooled water droplets adhered to the fuselage. The crew mentioned air speed sensor (pitot probes) at 0210 on data transcripts, and there is considerable contextual evidence that these sensors were blocked by ice. The probability that systems received highly erroneous data from the pitot tubes is very high, and therefore an erroneous response by the autopilot is also very likely. In this situation, the autopilot would attempt to fly the aircraft – issue instructions to the control surfaces – for a fictitious flight envelope. (The possibility of an ice induced dual engine flameout can now be ruled out.) That severe mismatch used up precious seconds, further added to the damaged hypercomplex environment and severely degraded situational awareness in the cockpit. Pilot performance during the last minutes of flight will be looked at below.
Air France 447 flew far above the altitude where hail can form. The barrier preventing tornadoes is similar and although they can occur in extremely strong super cells, they are very rare in tropical latitudes, shallow waterspouts excepted. Ice is most likely to be produced in the central area of the vertical structure of the cumulonimbus formations where precipitation is a combination of ice crystals and (supercooled) water droplets.
Lightening
Although lightening figured in early discussions of weather variables that challenged Flight 447, a consensus developed that lightening formation unlikely. A Mesoscale Convective System with these parameters will produce little or no lightening. “. . . cumulonimbus clouds in oceanic equatorial regions entrain considerable quantities of drier, cooler air that dampen upward vertical motion in the lower portions of the storm, and in some way this reduces charge separation.” A lightening strike upon F-G ZCP is very unlikely.
Warm Air Cells
One persistent theory portrays Air France 447 suddenly entering an area of relatively warm air which has different density and the autopilot response places the plane in a radically different position within the flight envelope that caused loss of control. This situation was not possible because warm sinks require clear air with specific parameters for intense subsidence, warming and drying that were not possible within the cumulonimbus and MCS that were present.
Leaking Toilet
Two other items on the list of possible causes for the Air Flight 447 crash can be quickly mentioned, then set aside. It appears that there was water leaking at low volume from the toilets in F-GZP before the flight began, a little reported item at this date. Undetectable at takeoff, could such water permeate critical parts of the aircraft? At high altitude, water in composite parts would freeze making these parts brittle and prone to breakage. More analysis of this situation is called for.
Terrorist Bomb
Two passengers on Air France flight 447 had names that matched those on a terrorist watch list. An immediate investigation by the French Ministry of the Interior concluded that this was a harmless coincidence. No terrorist organization has stepped forward to “claim responsibility” which is always a reflexive response from Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups, who use every attack to enhance their public image as powerful, terrifying and dangerous.
On July 11, 2009, EuroCockpit released an important information about other commercial flights that were close to Air France Flight 447 in terms of both distance and time. These flights tracked the same route to TASIL between FL 350 and FL 370. Iberia Airlines Flight 6024, Rio De Janeiro to Madrid, flying a Boeing 747 was only 12 minutes behind Air France Fight 447. IB-6024 found a safe flight path through severe storms that were not revealed in advance on their radar as managing director of Air France Pierre-Henri Gourgeon explained in Le Figaro July 8, 2009. Lufthansa 507, St. Paulo to Frankfurt was 20 minutes behind AF 447, and Air France Flight 459, Sao Paul to Paris was 37 minutes behind. Each flight encountered storm cells and diverted from their planned flight paths with distances that ranged from 11 to 80 nautical miles. Turbulence was reported as moderate and problems were experienced communicating with Dakar (Senegal) but these situations did not require satellite phone conversations from the crew.
OTHER FLIGHTS MAP-1 - OTHER FLIGHTS MAP PPRuNe (Professional Pilot's Rumour Network), June 26, 2009.
“The course correction – Event 3 – occurred with the core area of the storm complex, and the crew's slight leftward deviation implies that the crew was seeing radar reflectivity returns on the cloud material to the right of the '0210” animation, and as a result it can be presumed that it contained moderate to strong precipitation.” From T. Vasquez - Six minutes later, AF 447 impacted the ocean surface. This diagram was computed for 0145 UTC, which is five minutes prior to the entry of AF 447 into this region. Turbulence was likely encountered at 0150 UTC and/or 0158/0159 UTC when it was discussed by the crew – see Event 2 in the above table. The course correction was attempted while AF 447 was in central area of the storm complex. The slight leftward deviation implies the radar display revealed some features of the clouds that were to the 'right' of AF 447. Moderation to Strong precipitation is implied by this analysis. When AF 447 impacted the ocean, it was on the shallow side of the storm where moderate rain showers were likely.
These flights tracked the same route to TASIL between FL 350 and FL 370. Iberia Airlines Flight 6024, Rio De Janeiro to Madrid, flying a Boeing 747 was only 12 minutes behind Air France Fight 447. IB-6024 found a safe flight path through severe storms that were not revealed in advance on their radar as managing director of Air France Pierre-Henri Gourgeon explained in Le Figaro July 8, 2009. Lufthansa 507, St. Paulo to Frankfurt was 20 minutes behind AF 447, and Air France Flight 459, Sao Paul to Paris was 37 minutes behind. Each flight encountered storm cells and diverted from their planned flight paths with distances that ranged from 11 to 80 nautical miles. Turbulence was reported as moderate and problems were experienced communicating with Dakar (Senegal) but these situations did not require satellite phone conversations from the crew. The relatively brief time interval between these flights and Air France, Flight 447, indicates the rapidity of change with this MSC, an extremely important meteorological feature that must be emphasized in revised pilot training protocols. Ignorant and prejudicial commentary occasionally surfaces in which the PF and cockpit crew are labeled unintelligent professionals because they had enough time within which to properly react to the changing weather in the flight envelope. In addition to the almost complete absence of useful, accurate data displays in the cockpit, the surprising, extreme speed with which these huge, Mesoscale Convective storm systems can change presented an extreme challenge.
OTHER FLIGHTS MAP-2 - mm43 at PPRuNe (Professional Pilot's Rumour Network), April 26, 2011.
Perhaps, Lufthansa adjusted radar sensitivity and altered its flight path to dozens of miles to the west at the last moments to avoid these “huge storms”. BEA and Air France do not possess continuous flight data from Air France Flight 447 that would allow rigorous confirmation of flight path because the two important messages are separated by ten minutes. Consulting the flight plan” between “ORARO” and “TASIL and the last confirmed position at 2:10 AM, EuroCockpit calculates that in this ORORO region of the ITCZ, Air France 447 was ~3 nautical miles west of its planned flight path during the rapidly developing crisis. (Source #12). Flying at 0.8 Mach, Air France might have deviated west as much as 10 miles. At 2:10 AM Flight 447 my have been returning from that westerly flight path deviation limit because of rapidly deteriorating conditions at those coordinates. Flight 447 may have been ~3 nm from its approved flight path when the Pitot probes failed. A deviation of this magnitude cannot be a navigational error. (Strategic Lateral Offset Procedure) would create a one mile deviation east of the flight path, not 3 miles west. The EuroCockpit pilot team asks the obvious question. Assuming the crew was not so stupid as to never use their radar and thereby fly blindly into a monster storm, what exactly went on with respect to flight plan and flight path starting at 2:10 AM.?
The technicals that further describe this deviation from flight path, and that of Lufthansa Flight 507 which flew the same route to TASIL only 20 minutes behind AF Flight 447, establish that this deviation taken by the PF of both flights could only be due to a deliberate and professional considerations by the PF and crew. This deviation was carefully calibrated and would allow for a seamless re-integration with the approved, original flight path. There were several commercial flights that followed the same route to the TASIL waypoint within one hour of AF Flight 447 and they are briefly discussed below.
F-GZCP FLIGHT TRACK AREA ZOOM / WEATHER MAP
Map / Powerpoint Slide - AF 447 LE PLAN DE VOL / Presentation from Henry Marnet Cornus Blog at 20 Minutes (France)
This article is the fourth to be published on the Internet from our Air France Flight 447 project. Each of these 'chapters' in the AF 447 'ebook' can be read as a 'stand alone' article. The first article from this research was published on August and has two objectives: a) to illustrates management-engineer team collaboration for aircraft/spaceship design at its worst because such a work environment may have contributed to design defects in the Airbus family of aircraft; and b) pay tribute to the NASA Space Shuttle Program and the courageous astronauts who flew each mission. This article, which presents an overview of the last five minutes of AF Flight 447, is the third chapter in the AF 447 ebook.
The fourth chapter of the AF 447 eBook will look at the Pitot-static and angle of attack sensors whose data is essential to the Fly-By-Wire computer system's interaction with flight control surfaces. There is a consensus that iced over pitot tubes rendered the Airbus 330 computer system unable to properly instruct flight control surfaces because the essential data stream that conveyed physical parameters of the flight envelope was either absent or corrupted from a critical time point forward. The fifth chapter will look at the vertical stabilizer of Airbus 330 aircraft, review the problems inherent with carbon-resin components in aircraft design, review aviation incidents in which tail components detached from the aircraft fuselage, and attempt to asses the contribution to the Air France FLight 447 tragedy that was made by loss of the vertical stabilizer. The fifth chapter will examine the design approach that systems engineers term 'hypercomplexity' as inherently problematic in aircraft design, and attempt an integrative scenario to at least partially explain the AF 447 tragedy. Over design may severely degrade situational awareness in the cockpit, negate immediate pilot input during crisis situations and dramatically raise the probability that a worst case flying scenario will quickly dominate. A few suggestions for changes to aircraft design and pilot training will be offered. Target date to have all five chapters online by February 1, 2012. Photos and technical graphs are presented in a larger size than is usual for a web page so that details and small font text may be read as easily as is possible. The design of these web pages is optimized for a monitor resolution of 1400 x 900 (wide-screen, landscape) in order to enhance readability of photos and detailed data displays. If your monitor is set to display a smaller image, then 'backing out' (Ctrl - - ) or use of the horizontal scroll bar will be necessary. Please bookmark this page and occasionally check back to remain current with this publication schedule.
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 - precipitation ice(R) Map - NASA.jpg)
