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 NRT DATA BACKSCATTER BRIGHTNESS TWO LAYERS of NRT DATA - Visualization of the state of the atmosphere during the AF447 Event by Gregory Leptoukh et al, NASA / Goddard Space Flight Center "CALIPSO lidar vertical profile of attenuated backscatter, and AIRS horizontal swath of Brightness Temperatures (Tb) at 11um. The red line represents the approximate flight path of AF447." |
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| TABLE of CONTENTS CHAPTER FOUR - AF 447 / PITOT TUBES, ICE and CORRUPT DATA TO 'SYSTEMS' HYPERCOMPLEXITY 1 . . SPACE SHUTTLE CHALLENGER and O-RINGS .. ICE and AIRCRAFT WINGS . . ICE and AIRCRAFT ENGINES .. TAT . . AIR FRANCE, FLIGHT 447 FLEW INTO CONTIGUOUS TPTS DID F-GZCP TRIGGER LIGHTNING STRIKES . . HIGH ICE WATER CONTENT and ICE CRYSTALS / ENGINE POWER LOSS HIGH ICE WATER CONTENT REGIONS / CONVECTION and STORMS . . REFERENCES |
| This article is Chapter 4, of the synthetic analysis and timeline that is derived from our Air France, Flight 447 Research. Target date to have all chapters online is February 1, 2012. Photos and technical graphs are presented in a larger size than is usual for a web page so that details and small font text may be read as easily as possible. This web page was coded for 1280 x 800 monitor display which is a wide screen (landscape) format. Printout of Chapter 4 will be 35 pages in 11 x 8.5 inch format. Please bookmark this page and occasionally check back to remain current with the publication schedule for the AF 447 Project. |
| Comments and opinions in this article are the sole responsibility of Bennett Blumenberg and do not reflect the views of any organization, government or private, that are mentioned in this article. The author does not have any relationship, public or private with the individuals, corporations and organizations referenced or mentioned in this article. Editorial and Proof Reading Services - Bruce Blake of Advanced Hybrid Aircraft.> Published December 11, 2011. |
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HYPERCOMPLEXITY-1
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| Our Air France 447 research project will result in ~200 web pages, organized as an eBook with chapters, when completed. A professional background is not requisite to understand most of this presentation. Technical text and graphs can be skipped over by those so inclined. The situational awareness of Air France Flight 447 is complicated, that is the reality of this disaster, and there are several scenarios to be dissected and then interwoven. Contrary to some published analysis of this tragedy, it cannot be explained by pilot error. Elevating 'pilot error' to a position of priority and most importance only serves to erect a large screen that blocks out the multiple parameters that coalesced to produce this most awful commercial aircraft accident. Yes, the pilots in the cockpit of this Airbus A300 aircraft did make errors in judgment. They made decisions that in hindsight do not seem first rate, but then their situational awareness had been destroyed. In the dark of early morning hours, a crisis came upon F-CZCP that rapidly placed all lives at risk. The emphasis upon 'pilot error' is particularly insidious when used by the BEA of France. BEA is the rough equivalent in France of the American National Transport Safety Board (NTSB), and is the government agency that conducts all investigations of incidents involving French aircraft and airlines when such an inquiry is warranted. BEA stands for B(bureau) E(inquiry) A(aviation), which expands to Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses pour la Sécurité de l'Aviation Civile (BEA; English: Bureau of Enquiry and Analysis for Civil Aviation Safety]. BEA is known and respected throughout the world, make no mistake about that as you read criticisms of their investigation of Air France, Flight 447. Parallel to the investigation of the BEA are those of Airbus corporate, which may never be released to the public; and Air France, where at least a summary is expected for press publication. |
"Does The Stupid Thing Work" -
PowerBuilder Article: Does the Stupid Thing Work? by Mike Deasy
Would that such levity could genuinely apply to 'real life'.
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| A valid and complete explanation for the Air France, Flight 447 tragedy must reference several complex situations in an integrated manner. Single variable explanations are naive, simplistic and miss the larger view that the Airbus aircraft is designed to live its daily life with minimal human (pilot) input. State of the art aircraft computer systems have multiple levels of redundancy and are self healing to a remarkable degree. However, their intelligence is minimal and these systems cannot recognize certain critical situations as aberrant and dangerous, and deal with them with a self-protective protocol. This article casts a critical eye upon the'systems engineering' employed in the design of airbus aircraft and aeronautics. This research has conclude that the airbus aircraft is a hyper-complex system that cannot interact effectively with situations such as that encountered by F-GZCP. In such an environment, aircraft [computer systems] do not recognize the realities a 'damaged' flight envelope, and therefore it responds with 'behaviors' that do not match reality, and do not support aircraft survival. The dysfunctional self protective aspects of this system present the human pilot with a severe problem if he/she wishes to gain immediate manual control of the aircraft. Aircraft responses become dysfunctional within seconds, and the lives of passengers and crew are rapidly placed in extreme danger. Precious time is lost as the crew attempts to decipher data and messages on the Primary Flight Display, some of which do not accurately reflect the crisis that has so rapidly manifested. An adequate model for the Flight 447 disaster calls into question the assumptions and design of the Airbus Fly-By-Wire system as presented on this web site.. Performance of FBW in certain crisis situations degrades the options for positive response. The Boeing Fly-By-Wire is less rigid and is easier for the pilot to manipulate when he/she wishes to access Direct Law and manual control of the aircraft's flight behaviors. However, this article remains focused on Airbus aircraft and their 'systems' design. Understandably, both corporates will not disclose most of the 'deep details' of their respective approaches to FBW so the 'picture' of each 'system' is derived from fragments whose origins may be a corporate technical report or manual, or a blog discussion. |
 OPTIONS for the RECONFIGURATION of CONTROL LAWS Diagram - - Professional Pilots Rumor Network (PPRuNe), February 7, 2011 |
| In many ways, the flight of Air France 447 was a tragedy waiting to happen but it needs to be understood that bad weather did directly cause this crisis and dive towards the ocean in a simplistic 1:1 relationship. The weather had deteriorated and did present a serious challenge, but the difficulties to fly safely in the flight envelope should not have been impossible to meet. .. in theory. Several commercial flights traversed this area shortly before and after AF 447 as was discussed in Chapter 3. In this chapter, we look at how the ever changing profile of the flight envelope is communicated to the aircraft computer system so that the instructions to the flight control surfaces are continuously fine tuned as the autopilot ensures that the safest flight possible occurs. Most important to understanding the tragedy of Flight 447 is the identification of a) structural and instrument deficits and b) computer edited aircraft protocols, whose input into a rapidly changing, degraded flight envelope ensured that neither autopilot nor human pilots could retrieve control of F-GZCP and create a scenario in which survival was possible. Accurate assessment of cause and effect is essential if remediation procedures are to be effective on future commercial flights that use Airbus aircraft. |
 AUTOPILOT to FLIGHT CONTROL SURFACES Integrated Publishing - - Aviation Flight Manuals and Accessories |
| Unfortunately, corporate interests may have clouded aspects of the analysis as indicated by the response of pilot organizations and families to the presentations offered by BEA and Air France. Furthermore, years of industry promises that new state of the art, commercial aircraft, whose routine takeoff, flight and landings are largely under computer control, would provide the safest possible and superlative passenger experience unlike any offered previously, serve to dramatically heighten the emotional 'envelope' surrounding Air France 447, as witnessed by media reports and reactions of the general public. This author does not believe that the internal investigation conducted by Airbus on the Flight 447 incident will ever be made public, in whole or in part. Indeed for all we know, it has already been completed, and locked away from any but the top executives in the EADS and Airbus Company. For that reason, and in the interests that this 'synthetic analysis' be as complete as possible, a case study has been offered that illustrates how a breakdown in communication between engineers and management can dramatically affect an engineering priority that has life and death consequences. |
 A330 ADIRU FUNCTION Chart - .. Self Healing Avionics / Redundancy Harmful ... C.W. Johnson |
SPACE SHUTTLE CHALLENGER and O-RINGS
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| Before returning to the problems posed by 'hypercomplexity', it is essential to take a detailed look at the sensory units of the Airbus A330 aircraft, their input during the Flight 447 crisis; and the system response to corrupted and/or missing data. Perhaps the best case study on the public record for the aviation and space exploration industries is the explosion upon takeoff of the Space Shuttle Challenger on January 28, 1986.. The following quotations are taken from this article which is also intended to be a tribute to the Space Shuttle program and the thousands of dedicated people who 'made it happen' since the Space Shuttle Columbia flew STS-1 on 12 April 1981. As is well known, the story of the Space Shuttle Challenger mission STS 51-L January 28, 1986 is the story of the O-rings in the Solid Rocket Booster Joints which "contain the hot high-pressure gases produced by the burning solid propellant inside, forcing it out the nozzle at the aft end of each rocket." Record cold had descended upon Cape Canaveral during the evening of January 27, 1986 and the temperature at dawn the following day was 31F. The risk profile that developed was extreme. The Space Shuttle O-rings are "Critical 1 components which means that it is forbidden to rely on any backup. Nonetheless, NASA's reply to Thiokol's concerns was that if the primary O-ring failed, the secondary O-ring would still seal. As dawn rose on January 28, ice had accumulated over the launch pad. Exerting extreme pressure to maintain the NASA manifest (schedule) for this shuttle mission, NASA managers pressured Thiokol management and a launch was approved at 11:38 AM as ice began to melt." |
 FIRST SPACE SHUTTLE MISSION LAUNCH, APRIL 12,1981 Photo - NASA / Thirty Years of the Space Shuttle Program Click Here for FIRST SPACE SHUTTLE MISSION LAUNCH, APRIL 12,1981 / FULL SIZE |
| "Tragically, the primary O-ring had become so hard due to the cold that it could not seal in time, and the secondary O-ring was not in a proper seated position due to metal bending. There was now no barrier to the released gases and both O-rings had vaporized across 70º arc. Aluminum Oxides from the burned solid propellant had sealed the damaged joint but that barrier could not hold against the flame. These events occurred before Challenger cleared the launch tower . . . At T+37 seconds into the flight, and for the next 27 seconds, Challenger experienced the strongest wind shear events yet seen at launch in the space shuttle program. These shattered the temporary Aluminum Oxide seal and removed the last barrier to the flame from the burning fuel that was rushing through the joint. The plume near the aft attach strut on the right side SRB was visible at T+58.788 seconds. The plume became defined and intense and at T+60.238 seconds the right side of the SRB had begun to detach from the shuttle. There was visual evidence of the flame erupting through the joint and impacting the external fuel tank. At T+64.660, visual evidence was apparent that a leak had begun in the external hydrogen tank and pressure began to drop within two seconds. Neither the astronauts nor NASA flight controllers were yet aware of the developing disaster. " |
CHALLENGER O-RINGS BURN-THROUGH
Diagram - MIT School of Engineering - Engineering Systems Division
| "At T+72.284, the right SRB pulled away from the strut attaching it to the external tank, and Challenger underwent a severe lateral acceleration to the right. The crew was now aware of an abnormal situation. AT T+73.124, the breakup of Challenger began. The liquid hydrogen tank failed and was pushed into the liquid oxygen tank. The right SRB rotated and struck the the intertank structure. The vehicle began to come apart at T+73.162 at 48,000' as the external tank disintegrated. Abnormal aerodynamic forces with load factors ~400% of designed limits, quickly tore apart the space craft. . . .. The robustly constructed crew cabin and SRBs survived the breakup of the launch vehicle at 48,000' and the SRBs were detonated by mission control. The detached crew cabin was observed to exit the cloud of gases at T+75.237. Flying along a ballistic trajectory it reached a peak altitude of 65,000'. The crew cabin was in one piece and entered free fall with forces unlikely sufficient to cause a major injury but .. . . tragically, the cabin hit the ocean surface at 207 mph with a de-acceleration impact of 200G which is far beyond survivability." |
CHALLENGER DISINTEGRATES
Photo taken from the PAFB/IGOR camera site - JSC Digital Image Archive
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| The message in the tragedy of the Space Shuttle Challenger for that of Air France Flight 447, I believe to be well said by these three quotations. " . . . the investigations were forced to question the professionalism of government and industry management when important decisions interfaced with management and engineer culture, politics, media and public perceptions. The wide applicability of this material needs to be understood." |
| “The creed of manned space flight is you never fly with a known problem. Never. Get that word never. So . . . when the main ring is burned and the back-up ring is scorched in a joint and you don’t stop the goddamn thing right there and fix it, regardless of whether it be a band-aid fix or any other kind of fix, you have made a cardinal sin. You many times fly with unknown unknowns, but you do not fly with known unknowns.” - Chris Kraft, former director of JSC, 1991. |
| “. . there’s something drastically wrong when something that you think isn’t supposed to get any damage at all sustains that kind of damage, and you conclude it’s okay.” Mulloy, NASA Marshall Space Flight Center. |
| Analogous engineer-management communication breakdown may have infected the long history of Airbus aircraft design and production, and the development of the computer systems that are the heart of Fly-By-Wire. In spite of corporate security, evidence has been found and placed on the public record, that the problems inherent with design, deployment, maintenance and upgrade to the pitot tube sensor system in Airbus aircraft are akin in principle to those that crippled the development of effective O-rings for the space shuttle rocket booster engine joints. There are also similarities with the process by which carbon-resin parts for aircraft are designed, tested and evaluated. What emerges here is a scenario that systems engineers term 'hypercomplexity' - extreme complexity. When a design paradigm no longer works as intended, when the extremely deep integration of computer technology and 'self healing avionics' is suspected to be occasionally creating life threatening problems, then it is time to 'stop, look and listen'. In part, this book is a plea to do exactly that with the next generation of aircraft design, and by implication the next generation of manned space missions to the moon and planets if NASA can be restored so as to enable a return to those highly important, long term goals. |
 3-D MANDELBROT FRACTAL Digital Fractal Art - - by David Makin / Fractal Forums, August 2, 2009. |
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ICE and AIRCRAFT WINGS
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_412x375_FAA_Instrument_Flying.jpg) CLEAR ICE on AIRCRAFT WING FAA Diagram – FAA Instrument Flying Handbook / Chapter 2: Aerodynamic Factors |
 RIME and CLEAR ICE on AIRCRAFT WING FAA Diagram – FAA Instrument Flying Handbook / Chapter 2: Aerodynamic Factors |
| There are several different kinds of ice that can form on an aircraft in thunderstorms at high altitude. Each type can be very dangerous, the details are critical. Rime ice forms when small, fast moving supercooled water droplets (liquid to -40C) hit the airframe and instantly freeze. Rime ice does not spread but hundreds of droplets hitting the fuselage will trap air in pockets between the ‘ice’, that is why Rime ice looks milky. A rough irregular, milky surface rapidly builds up and disrupts air flow, particularly on the leading edge of wings and controls surfaces of aircraft. Flight 447 may well have spent its last 12 minutes flying amidst a succession of heavy thunderstorms and extreme turbulence for a distance of about 75 miles. In such a situation, rime ice would form on wings and fuselage areas, possibly Graupel as well. It is not unusual for commercial aircraft to encounter a storm situation of this type on several different trans Atlantic routes including those within the Intertropical Convergence Zone. |
 FROZEN MICRODROPLETS GIVE RISE to GRAUPEL Photo / Beltsville Agricultural Research Unit – Electron Microscopy Unit Snow Page |
| In some thunderstorms, snow crystals form and descend through supercooled water droplets. When supercooled water droplets condense on a snowflake, the snowflake increases in size via accretion. This snowflake shape and structure have become rime ice. When water droplets condense on a snow flake and then build up to the point where the original shape of the snowflake cannot be discerned, the ice is called Graupel. |
| Wing of NASA's Twin Otter research aircraft is covered with Mixed Ice which is a mixture of Rime and Clear Ice. The latter is clear, translucent ice formed by slow freezing of large supercooled water droplets. Notice the runback well past the leading edge and on the underside of the wing. |
 AERODYNAMIC EFFECTS of ICE FAA Diagram – FAA Diagram – FAA Instrument Flying Handbook / Chapter 2: Aerodynamic Factors |
 FROST on LEADING EDGE of WING FAA Diagram – FAA Instrument Flying Handbook / Chapter 2: Aerodynamic Factors |
 FROST on LEADING EDGE of WING Graphic - NASA / Airplane Plus Heat Plus Ice Equals Mystery – Aviation safety: New computer tool forecasts icing hazards, April 11, 2011 |
_NCAR.jpg) WING EXPOSED TO SUPERCOOLED WATER – by Marcia Politovich and Greg Thompson, National Center for Atmospheric Research - NASA-Lewis FAA/NCAR-RAP Supercooled Lg Drop Experiment, November 17, 1993 |
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A 16-inch portion of a wing being tested is lifted through a port in the Twin Otter's fuselage and exposed to supercooled liquid water then pulled back inside and photographed. |
ICE and AIRCRAFT ENGINES
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 JET ENGINE ICING Graphic - NASA / Airplane Plus Heat Plus Ice Equals Mystery – Nano Patents and Innovations, August 18, 2011 |
 ICE ACCRETION IN JET ENGINE Diagram – Aero Magazine (Boeing), 4th Quarter 2007 |
 RAM AIR TURBINE in ICING RESEARCH TUNNEL Photo – Icing Research Tunnel NASA, 1984 |
| When there is an apparent total failure of aircraft electrical systems, the Ram Air Turbine which is deployed automatically and driven by airflow passing over the fuselage, is the last remaining option for generating a very small amount of electricity. The amount of electric power produced is related to the strength of the airflow. On the Airbus A330, the RAT is located on the right wing (4th flap track fairing). The RAT powers the emergency generator via the Green hydraulic system. However when powered by the RAT, the emergency generator is inhibited when the slats are extended. Then the flight computers PRIM 1, SEC 1 and SEC 2 will be powered by the batteries!" The author has yet to find any mention of F-GZCP's RAT in the BEA reports or elsewhere, nor what functions it could theoretically power. The questions that would be raised about the F-GZCP RAT have some importance. Is there any evidence that the PF attempted to activate the RAT? Was the RAT of F-GZP iced up and functionally damaged? Are the emergency recordings of an Airbus aircraft able to record anything about RAT function for subsequent investigations? |
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The TAT ANOMALY
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 Photo / diagram – My take on the Air France Flight 447 by Scott Dennstaedt, CFI & former NWS meteorologist |
 TAT BASICS Photo / diagram – Icing Alliance / Engine Icing Project by J. Walter Strapp, 2007 |
| A TAT measurement error is produced by ice crystals building up in an area on the aircraft which sensors are located. In one example, ice crystals are partially melted by the heating element of the pitot tubes which causes a 0 degree Centigrade reading. In some instances, the 0 degrees C reading stabilizes for a long enough time period to allow for notice by the pilots during aircraft descent. In other situations, the TAT is transitory and cannot provide an early warning about ice crystal build up. |
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AIR FRANCE, FLIGHT 447 FLEW INTO CONTIGUOUS TPTS
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 ITCZ / TROPOPAUSE / -78degrees C / 20 knots / Convection strengthening My take on the Air France Flight 447 by Scott Dennstaedt, CFI & former NWS meteorologist |
 METEOSAT ANALYSIS By George Aumann AIRS Project Scientist – as published in - Pilot and Aviation Professionals comment upon the Air France Flight 447 Incident, Tim Vasquez, Moderator. Last updated, January 8, 2012. |
| Aumann believes the available METEOSAT data when analyzed as described, portray a weather pattern that is very relevant to that surrounding AF Flight 447 during the last several minutes of her flight. Although likely not visible on cockpit radar, thunderstorms - some very strong - were present above 15,000 m with peak above 20,000 m. This species of thunderstorm is strong, clustered and known as Contiguous TPTS. While the data limitations do not allow for calculation of the forces that impacted the vertical stabilizer, engine supports and other external aircraft structures, those forces were assuredly 'strong'. To quote Dr. Aumann from the weather.graphics.com Comments page - "Attached are some AIRS data from the 1:30 AM (local time) overpass on the same scale as your rendition of the METEOSAT 11um imager. We show Troposphere Penetrating Thunder Storms (TPTS) in red, magenta and cyan. The blue dots are thunderstorms at about 15 km altitude. The wildest ones are cyan, and peak well above 20 km. A TPST is defines as any object where the difference between the 1231 cm-1 window channel and the very strong water line at 1419 cm-1 is less than zero. We pull these objects from the data routinely to do an off-line cluster analysis. This was a cluster of essentially contiguous TPTS, extending about 150 km along and about 300 km across the path of AF447." |
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DID F-GZCP TRIGGER LIGHTNING STIRKES?
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| The possible presence of destructive lightning also falls in the category of weather parameters for which there could not be a cockpit radar display but which, if presence, were of considerable importance. The case for lightening impacting F-GZCP is very weak. Perhaps the strongest argument that lightning was present and important to the flight envelope of Air France, Flight 447 has been also been made on the comments page at Tim Vasquez's web site by 'Bob' and 'David'(NCAR). From Bob with respect to aircraft Triggered Lightning - ". . . "One single, triggered lightning stroke could well have gone undetected by WWLLN and not seen by any satellite. Airplanes trigger lightning all the time, especially when flying through embedded cumulous that reaches above the -10 isotherm. . . Any layer cloud more than 4000' thick extending up to the 0 degree, or -10 degree isotherm or above should be avoided. Most electric charge is separated in the region from -10 to -20 degrees C, so, if a cloud extends up to this height there is an excellent chance that the electric fields are growing to significant amplitudes in that area. Charge separated microscopically in the -10 to -20 degree C altitude regime is carried by the updraft to the top of the cloud. . . . WWLLN, which sees only about 10 to 20% of all lightning, and has a lower threshold around 40 kA peak current, nor was any seen by TRMM overpasses, which can see only see any given location under the subtrack for about 2 minutes during an overflight, . . . With triggered lightning, the maximum peak current may have been 'garden variety' of 10 to 20 kA, but since that current flowed through the skin of the craft (if it was struck by triggered lightning) then the damage to systems may have been larger than you might expect from natural, near by lightning." |
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From 'David' at NCAR on the weather.graphics.com Comments page who summarizes why lightning is believed to not be absent. "The storms in the ITCZ . . barely show up at all in terms of lightning production, although over the Atlantic lightning does becomes increasingly common as you near the African continent. . . On June 1^st (Julian Day 152), NASA’s TRMM (Tropical Rainfall Measuring Mission) spacecraft passed over the storms implicated in the Air France crash at about 0220 UTC, just minutes after the last ACARS message from the plane. One of the instruments on the TRMM satellite is a Lighting Imaging Sensor (LIS) – a near-infrared optical lightning detector that is capable of detecting lightning strikes within a 600 by 600 km area, . . . it did not record a single lightning strike as it passed over the ITCZ. . . Since the LIS instrument only monitors any given storm for about 80 seconds as it flies overhead it does not rule out the possibility of an anomalous lightning strike hitting the plane, but certainly suggests that lightning was not the dominant factor that many seem to assume." |
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HIGH ICE WATER CONTENT and ICE CRYSTALS / ENGINE POWER LOSS
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 CONVECTIVE SUPER CELL WITH DOWNWIND ANVIL / HIWC POSSIBLE Diagram - Engine Power Loss in Ice Crystal conditions by J. Walter, Strapp, Environment Canada in AERO Magazine, First Quarter 2010. |
| There is a considerable body of data that speaks to a relationship between regions of high convection within cumulonimbus storm cloud formations, and the loss of power with aircraft jet engines. A particular type of weather formation that involves the formation of super-cooled water and ice particles can be identified with difficulty on cockpit radar displays. The largest meso-scale convection systems are usually near accident sites. This section of the Air France Flight 447 research draws heavily upon material published in Boeing's Aero Magazine, and research conducted by J. Walter Strapp of Environment Canada: note references. Overall, there is relatively little known about the weather experienced by F-GCZP during its last five minutes. And we have almost no comment on what might have gone wrong with the aircraft's engines. One engine has been retrieved from the wreckage of F-GZCP that was located on the ocean floor and no analysis of this engine has yet been published. |
 PERIOD of ENGINE EVENTS Data Display – Jet Engine Power Loss in Ice Particle Conditions - The High Ice Water Content (HIWC) Cloud Characterization Study, by J. Walter Strapp, Environment Canada / NASA, March 22-24, 2010. |
| "Ice-crystal icing conditions connected to engine power loss are thought to be due to completely frozen ice crystals. When flying near convective weather through ice crystal conditions, pilots have reported a lack of airframe icing or ice detection (no supercooled liquid present), but they do notice the appearance of rain on the windscreen, sometimes at temperatures too cold for liquid water to exist. It has been confirmed that the appearance of rain is caused by small ice particles melting on impact with the heated windscreen. Pilots also have noted that the sound made by flight through ice crystals is different from the sound they hear when flying through rain. Although it’s not present on all airplanes, a total air temperature (TAT) variation has also occurred simultaneously with some engine events." |
| The absence of data about engine performance during the last five minutes in the life of Air France Flight 447, compels us to think further, particularly as the PF exclaimed at one point that he had control of F-GZCP, and that the aircraft climbed approximately 4,000' after stall from cruise altitude before commencing a rapid, fatal dive and impact with the ocean surface. The most recent BEA report states that the engines were performing at the time of impact, although no details about that 'performance' are given and may not exist in the ACARS or tape recorded data. GE Turbofan 640 engines are complicated, but judging from the few photographs of the retrieved engine, it does seem that a significant amount of engine structure is now available for analysis. It is proposed that F-GZCP became embedded in a complex convective weather system for which little data would be available on the PFD instruments, assuming they retained proper function which is doubtful from what can be derived. Most convective weather events occur in very warm, moist tropical environments. High altitude ice crystals are produced in a different species of convective weather. The term 'icing conditions' usually refers to weather below 22,000' when supercooled liquid droplets form ice on cold airframe surfaces. Aircraft icing is produced that can seriously affect not only aircraft engines, but the pitot-static and other sensor systems that are fixed to the exterior of the fuselage. |
 F-GZCP, GE TURBOFAN 640 JET ENGINE / COMPLEXITY Photo / Airbus Family Day - Taken by Pj.piotr / Wikimedia |
| The weather complex under consideration for the AF 447 flight envelope produces completely frozen ice crystals in the absence of super cooled water. Interpretation is difficult and confusing because pilots report an absence of airframe icing, and an absence of ice (supercooled water is not present). However, rain is often seen on the windscreen, and temperatures may be too cold for supercooled water to form. The appearance of rain is an illusion caused by small ice particles melting on the windscreen. Pilots report that the sound made be flying through this flight envelope of ice crystals is different from that heard when flying through air. In some, but not all of these events, a Total Air Temperature Anomaly occurs simultaneously with the engine events. |
 AF 447 - WIND ANALYSIS METEOSAT DATA Data Display - Airbus AF447 Rio-Paris : les pilotes ont évité les orages, monalbum.fr Image V 6.2 um channel of Meteosat Jan.6, 2009. The wind analysis moved items and cloudy water vapor across a sequence of 13 images (3h). The trajectory of the plane is shown in dark blue (3 large vectors). (Imprecise translation based upon Google Translate.) CLICK HERE for ORIGINAL PAGE IN FRENCH. |
 TRMM CONVECTION WITH LOW REFLECTIVITY Diagram - Atmospheric Characterization for High Ice Water Content in Deep Convective Cloud, by J. Walter Strapp, Icing Alliance / Environment Canada / NASA 2007 |
| "At 2 h 10 min 05, likely following the obstruction of the Pitot probes in an ice crystal environment, the speed indications became erroneous and the automatic systems disconnected. The airplane’s flight path was not brought under control by the two copilots, who were rejoined shortly after by the Captain. The airplane went into a stall that lasted until the impact with the sea at 2 h 14 min 28.” (BEA 3rd Interim Report, p.7.)" |
| “The engine pylons were found separated from the wings. They had deformations compatible with stress on the engines from below to above.” (p. 36) “The APU exhaust broke off from the fuselage rear cone on impact. It had deformations on the whole of the lower section. (BEA 3rd Interim Report, p.37.). |
| “Both engines were visually examined. This examination showed that they were producing power at the time of impact.” (BEA 3rd Interim Report, p.39.). We have no details as to exactly what was observed by the remote submersibles that lead to this conclusion, nor is there any hint as to the extent of power that was still produced at time of impact. In the absence of BEA comment on such questions, the author will speculate that the engines at the time of impact were producing very little power, and had ceased to produce any level of power that might have been useful amidst this crisis, had the PF been able to exert control over engine performance. “Analysis of the recorded normal load factor revealed zones of slight turbulence.” Note: According to the ICAO, “light” turbulence is defined as changes in the normal load factor at the centre of gravity of less than 0.5 g peak to peak. |
 AIR FRANCE, FLIGHT 447 / RECORDED TURBULENCE Data Table - BEA Interim Report No.3 on the Accident 1 June, 2009 . . . Air France 447, July 29 - August 4, 2011. |
| At 2 h 10 min 05, the sudden drop in the measured airspeeds, likely due to the obstruction of the Pitot probes by ice crystals, caused autopilot and autothrust disconnection (the thrust was then locked) and the change in flight control from Normal Law to Alternate Law. Airspeed decreased from ~275 knots to 60 knots, indicated air speed was displayed in the left side PFD. Significant turbulence is revealed by Autopilots inputs and the aircraft rolled about 8º to the right. The nose pitched up to 11º within ten seconds. “The PF announced "I have control" and made a quick left nose up input almost to the mechanical stops of the side stick. The nose pitched further up and at 02:10:10Z the stall warning activates.” The Flight Directors were not disengaged by the crew, but the crossbars disappeared. Considering the performance of F-GZCP immediately after the PF announcement, it seems likely that he did not have full control [of the aircraft] and that a change in responsiveness of the side stick amidst the growing sense of terror in the cockpit led to this call out. The very rapid climb of F-GZCP to ~36,000' then followed. It is proposed that this rapid climb was executed without, or in spite of PF input, that it was a response by 'systems (at least Primary Flight Computer 1) to a corrupt pitot-static data stream |
HIGH ICE WATER CONTENT / CONVECTION and STORMS
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| Engine power loss and damage events associated with convective ice crystals occur within anvil cloud regions of high altitude, convective storms. These particular storms occur at very cold temperatures where only ice can exist, yet there is an absence of radar reflectivity and therefore no airframe icing reports. Regions that produce these convective ice crystals create events with these characteristics.
Aircraft is crossing a convective, anvil cloud. |
| Airbus, Air France,. BEA and the Pilot's Union Law Suit need to look closely at the cloud structures that F-GCZP became embedded within. Past studies of cloud structures that were correlated with engine dysfunction have revealed high ice water content (HIWC). These cloud structures subdivide into two categories: classic convection; and nonclassic HWIC producing convection. This latter category, whose name is shortened to 'nonclassic convention' accounts for the environment in 80% of the engine events and it must be added to the list of 'considerations' in the weather analysis for Air France, Flight 447. |
 CONVECTION / HIWC DOWNWIND Diagram - Engine Power Loss in Ice Crystal conditions by J. Walter, Strapp, Environment Canada in AERO Magazine, First Quarter 2010. |
| This image depicts a vertical cross-section view as an airplane is headed for a classic convective cell. Colors represent standard airplane radar returns where green is light, amber is moderate, and red is heavy. In this scenario, the radar beam pointed straight ahead detects heavy precipitation and the airplane diverts and avoids the weather. There is, however, an area of high ice water content (HIWC) possible in the anvil cloud downwind from the convective core that pilots need to be aware of and avoid. |
| Classic convection has several distinct and well known characteristics: vigorous updrafts; typically found over land; moderate to heavy radar signatures to high altitudes which make the core areas and danger zones visible on the PFD instrumentation. Dangerous zones are avoided by diversiting the aircraft to the upwind side of the cell. Engine events, which are often 'off' then 'on' have been recorded in the anvil down wind from the cell's core. In the cumulonimbus anvil, HIWC may be present but ice particles return only enough radar energy to produce occasional green signatures on the cockpit radar display. There are also some classic convection structures that do not produce any radar signature. |
 AIR FRANCE, FLIGHT 447 - STORM CLOUD HEIGHT - STORM INTENSITY The quest for a smooth, safe flight - NCAR research helps keep passengers out of harm's way, August 3, 2009. |
| For research and upset recovery analysis to come, this is one of the most important graphs in this project - A Synthetic Analysis of Air France, Flight 447. This data set shows a simple and well known relationship and thus allows for a determination of the contribution that flight altitude may have made to the overall crisis index of F-GZCP and Flight 447. |
| Ice crystal events are most often associated with Non classic Convection which is characterized by weak updrafts, regions of decaying convection and regions of HWIC at high altitudes. Reflectivity is usually absent at flight level which creates great difficulty for the pilots. HWIC often derives from residual areas of merging and decaying cell updrafts within a larger convection system. The weak updrafts are not strong enough to send (ie 'loft') large ice particles to high altitudes, but they do have enough strength to loft high concentrations of small ice particles up to the tropopause. Hail and graupel are two types of large ice particles and they do show up on cockpit weather radar because they are effective radar reflectors. The absence of radar returns on the cockpit display indicates that only small ice particles are involved in ice crystal engine events. |
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| Regions that contain the potential to force engine events are: a) above the freezing level adjacent or downwind of heavy convective cores; or b) "above moderate to heavy rain that is associated with decaying convection or stratiform region with the convective system." To an outside observer, the anvil may become very large and have the morphology of a thick cirrus cloud shield that has lost its visual convective qualities. At this stage, the aircraft is in considerable danger because this huge anvil will not appear on cockpit radar displays. Individual convective cells and their attached anvil clouds have merged into one huge system. Engine events typically occur between 20,000' and 35,000' within a temperature range of 10 C to -40 C. Very occasional engine events are documented at altitudes as low as 9,000' with temperatures of 8 C; and at altitudes as high as 41,000' with temperatures as cold as -63 C. In other engine incidents, engines that were affected by ice crystals in HIWC convection cells recovered rather quickly. However, AF 447 was affected by several serious circumstances simoultaneously. Engine capability had ceased to have any asset value at high altitude before the final dive to the ocean surface. |
 CONVECTION / HIWC DOWNWIND Diagram - Engine Power Loss in Ice Crystal conditions by J. Walter, Strapp, Environment Canada in AERO Magazine, First Quarter 2010. |
| Radar view of typical ice crystal engine conditions This image depicts a cross-section view as an airplane is headed for a non classic convective system. During a typical ice crystal engine event, the airplane will be flying in a convective cloud with light radar returns at flight level. However, if the pilot uses the radar tilt function to scan below the airplane, moderate to heavy radar returns will be seen. These are regions to avoid because they are associated with regions of HIWC. |
| "In a majority of the ice crystal engine events, convective weather occurs in a very warm, moist, tropical-like environment. The atmosphere is generally slightly to moderately unstable, resulting in weak to modest updraft strength. During engine events, pilots report only light to moderate turbulence. These convective systems are generally large, heavy rain producing storms that have life cycles ranging from several hours to 24 hours or more. Typically, events do not occur in severe convection with strong updrafts because these cells are detectable at altitude, and pilots are able to avoid them. However, in some cases high concentrations of ice crystals can be present within the anvils of these storms either adjacent to, or downwind from, heavy cores." It does not seem that there is enough weather data in the 3rd BEA Report to allow for the convective cells of the storm that AF Flight 447 became embedded within to be modeled in detail, and then have that convective structure assessed for HIWC status and threat to engine function. Absence of radar data on the cockpit displays tell us something more than the obvious absence of radar display. That circumstance alone, should be the beginning of an attempt to model a convective storm of the structure discussed here, and at least speculate upon the effects of such a storm structure upon F-GCXP. A frozen and disabled pitot-static system cannot provide the entire explanation for the abnormal flight behavior of F-GCXP. |
 The FALL of ICARUS, by PETER BREUGHEL 1558 Archival Photo - Source of digital file for Wikipedia is manosuelta.files |
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| Analysis of the Air France 447 incident badly needs a fine grained body of data that speaks to the micro-environments immediately adjacent to the aircraft fuselage. The crew need the
ability to 'directly detect' the presence of supercooled water. By 'directly detect', is meant instrumentation and sensors on the exterior surface of the fuselage; new or upgraded displays in the cockpit; and the storage of this digital data for post flight analysis. Additional instrumentation and cockpit data display is badly needed, and should include the ability to detect ice of several types: clear, rime, graupel etc. Instrumentation ia needed to detect and record wind speed with directionality parameters in 1,000' increments. Also needed immediately are sensors to detect angle of attack in one minute increments, and make a crude first approximation for the essentials that create a 'stall'. Mach Number requirements include the compilation of a one minute digital record. Instrumentation that can make a preliminary assessment of updraft, downdraft and convection structures that elude radar detection also requires attention. Most this 'wish list' does not exist. For whatever reasons - ? budget savings - real time capture of the data enumerated here is almost never mentioned, and when an item or two does survive into a published article draft, all we read is a moan and lament worthy of a 13th century Welsh poet. . ... "Woes doth inflict us, and render us helpless in the dark" . . . In the obvious interests of preserving and saving lives, it is long past due to appropriate the funds required to develop this 'new' instrumentation in the fashion indicated here. The Pilot Flying and cockpit crew will find their situational awareness dramatically improved by magnitudes heretofore unimagined. New data stream can be developed for PRIM 1, 2 and 3. 'Systems' should not go mad and generate self-destructive instructions for flight control surfaces. Bizarre as it seems, that is what happened to AF Flight 447 when F-GZCP encountered radical changes in very rapidly changing flight envelope and there was no data displayed in the cockpit that was of any use to the crew. This 'mission statement' for 'situational awareness and weather' provides a new approach to aircraft safety and interaction because it is intended to develop a fine grained portrait of flight envelope realities. Yes, it should be expensive to implement. Much of this instrumentation, that is briefly alluded to, does not exist and will have to be developed from 'scratch'. There are new challenges for cockpit displays where it has long been assumed that if a weather structure cannot be detected by radar, then there is no cockpit data display that can be developed. The defeatism of the Welsh poet's lament should be set aside. Assignment of Responsibility is clear for past tragedies where the weather parameters were similar to those of Air France Flight 447. Upgrading the weather detection capabilities in the cockpit of the Airbus family of aircraft is long overdue. |
 PSS A330 VIRTUAL COCKIPIT Around the World, 2006 – by Cédric De Keyse, flightsim.com |
| The bottom line attribute of any commercial aviation model that must be driven by corporate considerations is that if The term 'Synthetic' is meant to indicate that all possible factors and parameters that might be relevant to a comprehensive analysis and reconstruction of the this terrible incident will be considered. Nothing will be omitted because it does not fit a preconceived model and a rigorous 'assignment of responsibilities' will be attempted at the end of the discussion. Suggestions for new/upgraded safety protocols and maintenance will not be modified due to cost. Assumption #00 is that no price is to be placed on the value of human life. If a safety protocol is deemed too expensive to implement due to corporate finance considerations, that it may be set aside, BUT THEN THE FLIGHT IN QUESTION IS TO BE SET ASIDE ALSO. HUMAN LIFE IS NOT TO BE GAMBLED WITH, AND FATE IS NOT TOO BE TEMPTED BECAUSE SOONER OR LATER FATE ALWAYS WINS. ICARUS WITH HIS WAX WINGS NEED NOT APPLY BUT POLITELY SHOWN THE DOOR AND TOLD TO GO ELSEWHERE . END OF STORY! |
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| CLICK HERE FOR A SUMMARY OF THE LAST FEW MINUTES OF AIR FRANCE, FLIGHT 447 - as integrated with transcripts of selected voice recordings. |
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 Cumulonimbus - Super cell Storm Photo - NCAR research helps keep passengers out of harm's way, August 3, 2009. |
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REFERENCES –
Back to Top
1. - Avoiding Convective Weather Linked to Ice-Crystal Icing Engine Events
- by J. Walter, Strapp, Environment Canada in AERO Magazine (Boeing), 1st Quarter 2010.
2. - Engine Power Loss in Ice Crystal conditions
- by Jeanne Mason, AERO Magazine (Boeing), 1st Quarter 04 / 2007.
3. - Avoiding Convective Weather Linked to Ice Crystal Engine Icing Engine Events,
by Matthew L. Grzych, AERO Magazine (Boeing), 1st Quarter 01 / 2010.
4. - NASA Funding Air Turbulence Prediction System
by Deborah Gage, Information Week, July 07, 2009.
5. - The Ice Particle Threat to Jet Engines in Flight,
and a New High IWC Cloud Characterization Study by J. Walter Strapp,
Environment Canada, Cloud Physics and Severe Weather
6. - RAT discussion for Boeing and Airbus aircraft at PPRuNe
- PPRuNe, Aug.29 - Sept.5, 2001.
7. - Re: Please answer - 757/767 Hydraulic Question
- From Newsgroups: sci.aeronautics.airliners, kls Tues Feb 23 00:10:17 1993
8. - (R)am (A)ir (T)turbine at Wikipedia
9. - The Dangers of Interaction with Modular and Self-Healing Avionics Applications:
Redundancy Considered Harmful by C.W. Johnson
10. - Aircraft flight control systems at Wikipedia
11. - Autopilot Lost and discussion at PPRuNe, February 7-14, 2011.
12. - Atmospheric Characterization for High Ice Water Content in Deep Convective Cloud,
by J. Walter Strapp, Icing Alliance / Environment Canada / NASA 2007.
13. - .. Self Healing Avionics / Redundancy Harmful .. C.W. Johnson
14. A330/A340 Flight Crew Training Manual by Airbus 2002
NASA-Lewis/FAA/NCAR-RAP Supercooled Large Drop Experiment (1993).
15. - Concise, advanced summary of Flight Control,
Fly By Wire and Aviation Laws for A340/A330 pilots - Excellent.
16. - Safety and Icing Conditions / Pilot's Friend.
17. A330 Systems / Technical for aviation industry professionals, June, 2007.
18. Air France Flight #447: did weather play a role in the accident? June 1st, 2009
An exceptional presentation of weather data (animated) from METEROSAT 9, and GOES-10 IR /
from the Space Science and Engineering Center CIMSS Satellite Blog /
University of Wisconsin-Madison / Space Science and Engineering Center.
19. - Airborne-Weather-Radar Interpretation, by Ian Gilbert, Honeywell
20. - General Aviation Lightning Strike Report and Protection Level Study, DOT / FAA, August, 2004.
21. - NWP SAF Satellite Application Facility
22. - FBW Reconfiguration Laws for the A340 and A330 23. - Losses of, or temporary anomalies in, indicated speeds 24. - Crash: Air France A332 over Atlantic on June 1st 2009, 25. - Air France Flight 447: A detailed meteorological analysis by Tim Vasquez. 26. - Pilot and Aviation Professionals comment upon the Air France Flight 447 Incident, 27. - Visualization of the state of the atmosphere during the AF447 Event 29. - Concise, advanced summary of Flight Control, 30. Airbus 330/A340 Flight Crew Training Manual 31. BEA Update on Investigation, May 27, 2011. 32. - Pilotos de Airbus não seguiram altitude de plano de voo; buscas prosseguem 32. - Avião da Air France enviou ao memos 6 alert as,
for Numerical Weather Prediction / Dec. 1. 2010.
- 29 excellent slides from an Old Powerpoint presentation. Original publication date unknown.
from PPRuNe, July 19-22, 2011.
occurring in cruise on Airbus A330 / A340. - BEA Report about 13 incidents. />
aircraft entered high altitude stall and impacted ocean,
by Simon Hradecky. Events covered from June 19, 1999 to most recent update on January 8, 2012 - 77 pages.
- Revised and closed on June 1, 2011, 15 pages. Recognized throughout the aviation industry
as one of the finest weather analysis available for the AF 447 Incident.
Tim Vasquez, Moderator. 97pp of the best commentary available.
Last updated, January 8, 2012.
by Gregory Leptoukh et al, Goddard Space Flight Center / NASA.
Fly By Wire and Aviation Laws for A340/A330 pilots.
- Folha Online, March 6, 2009 (Brazil, Portuguese).
queue indicam uma sequência de falhas em equipamentos essenciais.
- Journal de Tarde de, June 3, 2009 (Portuguese).
33. - Rime and Graupel - USDA, Beltsville Agricultural Research Center (BARC),
- Electron Microscope Unit Snow Page.
34. - Airbus 320/330 Panels by Eric Marciano, 2001-2003. - gamesho / VGameNetwork
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| This article is segment from our Air France Flight 447 project. Each of these 'chapters' in the AF 447 'ebook' can be read as a 'stand alone' article. The first article from this research was published in August, 2011 and has two objectives: a) to illustrates management-engineer team collaboration for aircraft/spaceship design at its worst because such a work environment may have contributed to design defects in the Airbus family of aircraft; and b) pay tribute to the NASA Space Shuttle Program and the courageous astronauts who flew each mission. This article reviews several advanced weather paramaters that have yet to receive much attention, and may shed new light on the storm(s) that AF-447 found itself embedded within. This article is chapter 4 in the AF 447 ebook and is potentially of some importance. |
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| The fifth chapter of the AF 447 eBook will look at the Pitot-static and angle of attack sensors whose data is essential to the Fly-By-Wire computer system's interaction with flight control surfaces. There is a consensus that iced over pitot tubes rendered the Airbus 330 computer system unable to properly instruct flight control surfaces because the essential data stream that conveyed physical parameters of the flight envelope was either absent or corrupted from a critical time point forward. The sixth chapter will look at the vertical stabilizer of Airbus 330 aircraft, review the problems inherent with carbon-resin components in aircraft design, review aviation incidents in which tail components detached from the aircraft fuselage, and attempt to asses the contribution to the Air France FLight 447 tragedy that was made by loss of the vertical stabilizer. The seventh chapter will examine the design approach that systems engineers term 'hypercomplexity' as inherently problematic in aircraft design, and attempt an integrative scenario to at least partially explain the AF 447 tragedy. Over design may severely degrade situational awareness in the cockpit, negate immediate pilot input during crisis situations and dramatically raise the probability that a worst case flying scenario will quickly dominate. A few suggestions for changes to aircraft design and pilot training will be offered. Target date to have all five chapters online by March 1, 2012. Photos and technical graphs are presented in a larger size than is usual for a web page so that details and small font text may be read as easily as is possible. The design of these web pages is optimized for a monitor resolution of 1400 x 900 (wide-screen, landscape) in order to enhance readability of photos and detailed data displays. If your monitor is set to display a smaller image, then 'backing out' (Ctrl - - ) or use of the horizontal scroll bar will be necessary. Please bookmark this page and occasionally check back to remain current with this publication schedule. |
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